Support for scientific research depends on the public's perception of the legitimacy of the scientific enterprise. Without the expertise or means to monitor or verify that scientists are conducting their work appropriately, the public must rely on the scientific community to maintain high standards.  Legitimacy is conferred on science through the public's trust that scientists choose important problems on which to work, that they carry out their work according to accepted and appropriate means, that they use financial resources responsibly, that they present their findings fully and without deceit, and that their work genuinely improves the lives of others.

 

Science is, however, a human enterprise, and scientists are not perfectly and at all times worthy of the public trust.  When scientists make honest errors, mechanisms built into the scientific enterprise are supposed to correct the mistakes.  Peer review of proposals and manuscripts is a way for granting agencies and journals to rely on experts to find mistakes or problems in research, so that errors will not waste funds or taint the research record.  Unfortunately, pressures on the peer review system compromise its effectiveness, as competition for funds increases the numbers of grants and manuscripts that require reviews.

 

When mistakes escape detection and incorrect results are published, replication is supposed to safeguard the research record.  Replication will sometimes reveal problems, if the research is important enough to attract the attention of other scientists.  If findings are not particularly important or in an area of science that is currently seen as "hot," they are not likely to be replicated.  Scientists prefer to work on extending previous results, they may have trouble getting replicated findings published, and they do not get much recognition for doing what others have already done.

 

When scientists produce fraudulent research, however, through deliberate and intentional misbehavior, peer review and replication become even less reliable mechanisms for correction.  Intentional fraud usually involves efforts to mask altered or invented data or inappropriate aspects of the work.  Reviewers and other scientists who assume that work is done without deliberate wrongdoing are not going to look specifically for its tell-tale signs.  Indeed, scientists who cannot replicate previous findings tend to assume that there is something wrong with their own methods or that the original authors have not provided complete descriptions of the methods they used (Anderson, Ronning, De Vries and Martinson, 2007).

 

The extent of damage done by fraudulent research depends on its exposure.  Fraudulent research that never attracts much attention and never serves as a foundation for further work may never be uncovered.  In this case, fraud still affects the scientific enterprise by falsely inflating the scholarly records of the authors, thereby giving them unfair competitive advantages.  Research that is exposed as fraudulent is quite another matter.  It becomes a matter of grave concern to the higher-education system that depends on public trust and goodwill.  Damage to the legitimacy of science due to a single instance of scientific misconduct can be far-reaching, as recent well-publicized cases have shown (for example, Eric Poehlman in the U.S., Hwang Woo-Suk in South Korea, Pattium Chiranjeevi in India, Jon Sudbø in Norway, Li Guibao in China, Reiner Protsch von Zieten in Germany, Shinichi Fugimura in Japan, and so on).

 

The research that my colleagues and I have done over the past eight years provides relevant empirical evidence.  Our work represents the only national, cross-disciplinary study of scientific misconduct done to date.  It is based on a 2002 national survey of two groups of U.S. scientists (a total of 7,760) who had received research support from the U.S. National Institutes of Health.  The response rates were 52% for the mid-career group and 43% for the early-career group.

 

In our survey, we asked respondents if, during the previous 3 years, they had or had not engaged in specific behaviors that could be categorized as misconduct or as questionable research practices.  Misconduct (fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism) was admitted by 1.7% of the respondents (Martinson, Anderson, De Vries, 2005).  This percentage is low but nonetheless troubling, given that every instance has the potential for serious damage to the scientists' institutions, if revealed.  Over 40% of mid-career respondents had engaged in at least one misbehavior in the following categories: research methods, policy, use of funds, inappropriate outside influence, and cutting corners (Anderson, Horn, Risbey, Ronning, De Vries, Martinson, 2007).

 

We have also investigated the connection between scientists' self-reported misbehavior and their work environments.  Our research has demonstrated that some of the characteristics of fast-track, high-pressure environments are associated with higher levels of misconduct and misbehavior:  high levels of competition (Anderson, Ronning, De Vries and Martinson, 2007), dominance of non-traditional norms of science (Anderson, Martinson and De Vries, 2007), and shifts in organizational reward structures that some may see as unfair (Martinson, Anderson, and De Vries, 2006).  Unfortunately, neither training nor mentoring proves effective in ensuring good behavior; in fact, both show some associations with higher levels of misbehavior (Anderson, Horn, Risbey, Ronning, De Vries and Martinson, 2007).

 

It is critical for institutional and national systems to ensure that innovation proceeds in ways that maintain integrity and legitimacy:  that they take proactive steps to ensure that scientists — individually and collectively — conduct their research in accordance with the highest standards of professional integrity. Innovation environments must also be integrity environments, if innovations are to be successful and sustained.

 

Our analyses indicate the extent of the misconduct problem in the U.S. and its potential to damage the legitimacy of the scientific enterprise.  The prevalence of misconduct and questionable research practices is unknown in other countries, but that fact does not provide assurance that such practices do not exist.  To the contrary, not knowing about behavior that may compromise research integrity leaves institutions and funding agencies vulnerable to unfortunate surprises, should misconduct be uncovered and exposed by the media.

 

I therefore make the following recommendations:

1) Greater attention to scientific misconduct.  Assuming that scientists never do things that might compromise the integrity of science is a risky strategy.  If instances of misconduct are exposed in the media, leaders and institutions may not be well prepared to deal with the misconduct or with the resulting media attention.  Avoidance also wastes an opportunity to avert misconduct through policy development, open discussion and instruction about appropriate and inappropriate conduct, the risks and costs of misconduct, and the sanctions to be imposed. 

2) Development and articulation of national and institutional policies on research misconduct and research integrity.  National and institutional policies vary widely in terms of what is considered misconduct and how it is to be handled.  The work of the OECD Co-ordinating Committee for Facilitating International Research Misconduct Investigations of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, 2007; Boesz and Lloyd, 2008), toward international harmonization of policies and procedures, is a promising step.

3) International cooperation in inquiries, investigations and adjudication of cross-national misconduct.  Science is an increasingly global enterprise, involving dense webs of international scientific collaboration.  These collaborations are not immune to behaviors that compromise research integrity, and the lack of international mechanisms for addressing ethical problems is a substantial concern.  A formal means must be developed for enacting both fair reviews of alleged misconduct and binding sanctions on guilty parties.

4) Alignment of institutional and national policies on research integrity.  National efforts to ensure research integrity must be supported by institution-level efforts.  The U.S. model of placing primary responsibility for research integrity on research institutions may not be appropriate in other countries.  In any case, however, institutions are the sites where research is done and where appropriate conduct needs to be assured.  Persistent and insistent efforts to promote integrity and avert misconduct must be seen as the collective responsibility of the scientific community, supported by institutional policy, administration and resources.

5) Intensified and improved training in the responsible conduct of research.  Our research has shown that training and mentoring do not always have the salutary effects that one might expect.  Scientists must adopt effective methods of instruction in the responsible conduct of research, not relying on cursory or didactic instruction to meet formal instructional expectations.  Group mentoring, for example, may counter the effects of an individual mentor's career advice, which we have found is associated with higher levels of misbehavior (Anderson, Horn, Risbey, Ronning, De Vries and Martinson, 2007).  Another promising strategy is collective openness (Anderson, 2008), which requires every person working on a scientific project to raise questions about any aspect of the work that seems either scientifically or ethically inappropriate.  Scientists who wish to promote collective openness as a defense against potential misconduct must be openly and deliberately supportive of questions from everyone in the laboratory about the design, methods, conclusions and interpretations of the work.  This kind of persistent, everyday attention to the ethical aspects of science holds great potential for averting misconduct and maintaining the legitimacy of the scientific enterprise.

 

Institutional and national systems that do not take proactive steps to ensure the integrity of science are putting their research-based innovations at risk.  When the media expose high-profile cases of misconduct, it is rare that an individual scientist takes all the blame.  To the contrary, reports nearly always reference the high-pressure environments in which the scientists work.  These environments must be the targets of interventions that will secure the integrity of scientific research while promoting innovation. 

 

 

 

ANDERSON, M.S. (2007) "Collective openness and other recommendations for the promotion of research integrity",  Science and Engineering Ethics, 13(4), pp. 387-394.

 

ANDERSON, M.S., A.S. HORN, K.R. RISBEY, E.A. RONNING, R. DE VRIES, and B.C. MARTINSON (2007) "What do mentoring and training in the responsible conduct of research have to do with scientists' misbehavior?:  Findings from a national survey of NIH-funded scientists", Academic Medicine, 82, pp. 853-860.

 

ANDERSON, M.S., B.C. MARTINSON, R. DE VRIES (2007) "Normative dissonance in science:  Results from a national survey of U.S. scientists", Journal of Empirical Research in Human Research Ethics, 2(4), pp. 3-14.

 

ANDERSON, M.S., E.A. RONNING, R. DE VRIES, and B.C. MARTINSON (2007), "The perverse effects of competition on scientists' work and relationships", Science and Engineering Ethics, 13(4), pp. 437-461.

 

BOESZ, C. and N. LLOYD (2008), "Collaborations: Investigating international misconduct", Nature, 452, pp. 686-687.

 

MARTINSON, B.C., M.S. ANDERSON and R. DE VRIES (2005) "Scientists behaving badly", Nature, 435, pp. 737-738.

 

MARTINSON, B.C., M.S. ANDERSON, and R. DE VRIES (2006) "Scientists' perceptions of organizational justice and self-reported misbehaviors", Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics, 1(1), pp. 51-66.

 

OECD [ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL SCIENCE FORUM] (2007), Best practices for ensuring scientific integrity and preventing misconduct.  (Retrieved at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/17/40188303.pdf on November 6, 2008).